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ABSTRACT: Current inquiry into nongenetic forms of inheritance has 
deep roots in the nineteenth century. Samuel Butler’s evolutionary sci-
ence writing and fiction points ahead, beyond the twentieth-century 
dismissal of pre-Darwinian science, to our own questions about how 
the experiences of an individual organism may effect change at the 
species level. This includes the way that symbolically mediated infor-
mation, which rapidly shapes the human environment, exercises a 
downward pressure on slower-moving, genetic change. Butler’s theo-
ries of unconscious memory and extended cognition, along with the 
Lamarckian principle that acquired traits could be passed on to de-
scendants, together constituted an “evo-devo” approach to species 
history. In particular, language—specifically literary language—for 
Butler functioned as a machinate extension of the mind that could 
communicate transformative information to successive generations. 
Such extension therefore enables the little events of a lifetime to reach 
into the evolutionary future and transform it.
An early champion of Darwin who subsequently became a vocal 
critic of the theory of natural selection, Samuel Butler was at once 
part of the popular scientific community busy making sense of natu-
ral history in the wake of Darwin and a maverick outsider who “lost” 
in the evolution debates of subsequent decades.1 In his mature evo-
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58 Configurations
lutionary writings, he looked back to Jean Baptiste Lamarck’s con-
cept of use inheritance, identifying with Herbert Spencer and others 
as part of “a growing band of those who have risen in resistance 
against the Charles Darwinian system” by protecting the theory of 
transmissible, acquired characteristics.2 Use inheritance, the devel-
opment-centered theory that habits acquired during the lifetime of 
an organism could be passed down to its descendants (famously il-
lustrated in the image of the giraffe stretching its neck for the higher 
leaves), was dismissed by twentieth-century biologists as a form of 
“just-so” story when Mendelian genetics supplied a mechanism for 
inheritance compatible with Darwinian selection.3 Neo-Lamarckism 
of the kind that Butler embraced, with its signature Victorian em-
phasis on self-improvement and progress, seemed at that point to be 
left in the dust heap of evolutionary-scientific history. 
However, this ontogenetic (or developmental) emphasis in hu-
man evolution, including the principle that environmental changes 
could trigger heritable adaptations, did not vanish in the wake of 
the Darwin/Mendel, or modern, synthesis. In some ways, Butler’s 
work is compatible with present inquiry into the nongenetic factors 
in evolution. The organism that will survive and reproduce, in the 
Darwinian model, is the one whose particular genetic configuration 
determines the phenotype providing the best fit for the environ-
ment, or “niche,” it occupies. Yet, along with genetically inherited 
traits, environmentally triggered “switches” that determine whether 
or not a gene will be expressed, as well as learned behaviors that 
enable it to adapt to and transform its environment, also shape in-
dividual characteristics.4 Moreover, as they develop, organisms react 
to and reconfigure niches.5 Among humans, of course, culture plays 
against the Grain: A Critical Overview, ed. James G. Paradis (Toronto: University of To-
ronto Press, 2007), pp. 113–142. 
2. Samuel Butler, “The Deadlock in Darwinism,” in Essays on Life, Art and Science, ed. 
R. A. Streatfield (London: A. C. Fifield, 1908), pp. 234–340, quote on p. 240.
3. Peter Bowler, The Eclipse of Darwinism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1992), p. 60.
4. Recent studies of gene expression show that the DNA sequence does not necessarily 
have the executive function in development, and that nongenetic mechanisms may 
trigger heritable changes. See Eve Jablonka and Marion J. Lamb, Evolution in Four Di-
mensions: Genetic, Epigenetic, Behavioral, and Symbolic Variation in the History of Life 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005) and Epigenetic Inheritance and Evolution: The Lamark-
ian Dimension (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Richard C. Francis, Epi-
genetics: The Ultimate Mystery of Inheritance (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011).
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an enormous role in this mutual constitution of environment and 
developing organism, and hence in shaping the biological landscape 
on which natural selection acts. As Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd 
put it, “[c]ulture . . . lead[s] to evolutionary processes that are every 
bit as real and important as those that shape genetic variation.”6
The study of late-nineteenth-century evolutionary science can 
contribute to such inquiry not just because it models the revival of 
use inheritance as a concept, but also because it introduces the fac-
tor of symbolic inheritance and its relationship to biological devel-
opment and evolution. As both a popular science writer and author 
of fiction, Butler was predisposed to recognize narrative and print 
culture as factors in biological inheritance and species-level change. 
Writing preserved the events of a single lifespan and communicated 
these to future generations, where they then formed part of the en-
vironment of development. Yet, because he did not distinguish be-
tween physical traits and mental events, cultural inheritance was 
for him fundamentally a biological process. Proposing that life con-
sisted in the automatically generated memories of ancestral forms 
or deep, unconscious “ideas,” the mind became for him the locus 
of heredity, the place where every organism continually encounters 
its former incarnations. Written-down memories, because they out-
last living brains, function as prosthetic tools that can expand our 
awareness of these earlier forms and the habits they have transmit-
ted to us, where in the body these are only experienced as uncon-
scious tendencies or reflexes. Writing that takes the form of litera-
ture, which deliberately manipulates perception and shows us our 
reflexes in an unfamiliar light, can, by this reckoning, shift innate 
ideas and thus directly alter the fortunes of species.
Mind, Memory, and Extension
Utopian as this all may sound, Butler’s theories anticipate not only 
current investigation into the heritability of culturally acquired 
traits, but also an approach in contemporary cognitive science that 
does not limit thought and memory to what takes place in indi-
vidual brains. A proponent of what is now called extended cognition, 
he understood mental activity as that which derives from external 
bodies as much as from internal nervous events, and that does not 
therefore respect firm boundaries between human and nonhuman, 
or between animate and nonanimate; thinking people, in this view, 
are fundamentally inseparable from the environments they encoun-
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ter, build, or manipulate. In many ways, Butler forecasted the well-
known thought experiment conducted by philosophers Andy Clark 
and David Chalmers in 1998, which asked whether the difference 
between an Alzheimer’s patient who records directions in a note-
book and a healthy person who stores this information in the brain 
might be only a matter of the degree of extension.7 Surely, Butler 
mused more than a century earlier, individuals cannot be discrete, 
bounded beings if we cannot draw a line “between the influence 
of those parasites which are within us but are not yet us, [or be-
tween] the external influence of other sentient beings and our fel-
low men?”8 Like Clark and Chambers, Richard Menary really only 
revives Butler’s question when he challenges the readers of his re-
cent Cognitive Integration to define the organic boundary between a 
spider and its web.9 
For Butler, however, this dismembering of the bounded being 
takes place not just in the indeterminate space of extended cogni-
tion, but also across time. According to his theory of evolution, we 
belong as much to the remote past as we do to the present, and it 
is a deep, unconscious memory that links us to that past. In Life 
and Habit, he described all organic processes, physical and mental, 
as accumulated memories of ancestral behaviors that begin as acts 
of will, but that are routinized and then transmitted as habits into 
the traits of descendants. Life, in this understanding, is “knowledge 
[that has] passed through so many . . . as to become living and in-
carnate” (p. 40). As deliberate efforts of the conscious mind evolve 
into reflex activity (partly, in the interests of efficiency, in order that 
we do not have to keep remembering them), memory embeds itself 
below the threshold of awareness in “vast” and “infinite” (p. 50) 
repetitions that organize life at microscopic levels.
As I shall show later in this essay, Butler’s fiction tried to ani-
mate these two axes of what might be called his extensionist evo-
devo: the development of the individual through its connection 
with other beings, as well as with the remote past. But the stories 
did not just reflect the philosophy; in fact, they provided an exten-
sion all of their own by lending imaginative form to the unthink-
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able—or specifically bringing to mind what is buried in the uncon-
scious dimensions of organic experience. Although growth, in his 
terms, is a perpetual crossing into other entities and a remembering 
of earlier ones, we actually perceive nothing of this; indeed, in or-
der to manage our day-to-day conditions of existence, we rely upon 
sense-bound convictions that biological entities and psychological 
personalities are bounded in time and discrete in form (p. 78). We 
are, nonetheless, willing to engage in cognitive play and to imagine 
the world outside of our habit-bound perspective: for example, But-
ler suggests, we can speculate that to a body infinitely larger than 
our own, all human-scale matter could appear a “lichen-like growth 
over the earth” (p. 129). 
In itself, this exercise is clearly more literary than scientific. But-
ler’s extravagant notion of extension—the idea that “we are rooted 
in outside things and melt away into them” (ibid.)—does not make, 
as he put it, “the smallest pretense to scientific value” (p. 1). Instead, 
its aim is to “entertain and instruct the numerous class of people 
who . . . enjoy speculating and reflecting (not too deeply) on the 
phenomena around them” (p. 2). Indeed, for Butler, science itself 
has to become more like fiction if it is to open minds to this concept 
of development as a movement of other entities across and through 
us. At the same time, it must respect nature’s constraints, even 
on imagination. All efforts to gather and advance knowledge, he 
stressed, must combine speculative thinking with deeply embodied 
ideas inherited from generations past. If treated like speculative writ-
ing, science can introduce ideas with “a painter’s license” (p. 302) 
so as to shift some presuppositions—or, as Butler put it, “[think] to 
us” (p. 303). The scientist’s “art” may, in this way, make us feel new 
things and act in new ways. Nonetheless, it must carefully assimi-
late these new ideas to old if we are to have any hope of absorbing 
them, for anything too foreign to our received understanding will 
wither and die. Only by respecting this economy of mind can sci-
ence, fiction-like, “open a door,” allowing us to glimpse “a strange 
and interesting transformation” (p. 306) or capture truths about our 
nature that escape the automatic thoughts shaping us from the past. 
Butler’s fiction-like science, therefore, hoped to generate new ways 
of being that could shift generations of habit. If, as he proposed, life 
consists of a vast collection of unconscious memories, then there 
must be a mechanism for evolutionary or phylogenetic change 
whereby older habits can eventually be supplanted by new ones. 
Were it the case that the circumstances of the past entirely shaped 
existence in the present, then there could be no real change in a 
species, merely an infinite building up of forms. Arguing that habits 
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picked up by an organism during its lifetime could be transmitted to 
subsequent generations, Butler assumed that accidental discoveries 
or deliberate instruction could modify and improve an instinct. He 
proposed that such modifications, perhaps over generations, remain 
conscious until they stabilize into instincts and become part of the 
innate disposition of an organism. Yet, not all lower individuals will 
discover a route to more advanced nature in this way: “It would be 
enough that there should occasionally arise somewhat more gifted 
specimens of one or more original forms. These would vary and the 
ball would thus be set rolling, while the less gifted would remain in 
status quo provided they were sufficiently gifted to escape extinc-
tion” (p. 254). This notion of the “gifted specimen” allowed Butler 
to avoid both Lamarck’s romance of inherent ingenuity in all life and 
Darwin’s blind selection that denied all “motive power to originate 
and direct the variations which time is to accumulate” (p. 261). Evo-
lution, he suggested, is driven neither entirely by deliberate striving 
nor by forces indifferent to the fate of species. 
Alongside this theory that change depended on the appearance 
of the gifted specimen, however, was the problem of the excessive 
anomaly—the sudden appearance of a trait whose too-radical form 
meant it would not be able to accommodate itself to the world it 
inhabits. If a new element was too foreign to the environment in 
which the organism functions, he argued, if its “ideas” (or traits) 
were too radical and incapable of “fusion with preceding ideas” (p. 
205), then it would fail to influence its descendants. This might be 
expressed in sterility, since all biological functions were ultimately 
“habits,” an idea could potentially rupture reproductive potential or 
it might manifest psychologically in despair and thus probably in 
death. On the other hand, if the new form or gifted type were not 
too unfamiliar, it would “open the door for all manner of further 
variation—the new ideas having suggested new trains of thought, 
which a clever example of a clever race will be only too eager to 
pursue” (ibid.). This middle way allowed for variation and “cross-
ings,” yet also recognized the homeostatic constraints that sustain 
life across the generations. 
The theory of heritable ideas and their variation implicitly asks 
whether those stored outside living bodies—the thoughts recorded 
in books and other nonbiological archives—are transmitted along-
side or through organic memory. There are moments in Life and 
Habit when human cultural evolution seems to become a thing of 
its own, parallel or analogous, rather than entwined with biological 
change:
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Like anomalous traits, new concepts may either come into the world 
stillborn, or they may generate cognitive variation from the deep 
script of heredity read over and over again by unconscious mem-
ory. Provided they do not overwhelm and destroy the individual 
entirely, such notions might interrupt the code of development and 
generate new habits that would, in turn, become part of the mental 
character of that individual and then of its descendants.
Therefore, it is the interweaving of inherited biological nature and 
inherited human culture—the way that culture is embedded in liv-
ing bodies—that represents the truly development-centered nature 
of Butler’s evolutionism. The key to this approach is to be found in 
associationist psychology. In his praise of Ewald Hering’s 1870 lec-
ture to the Imperial Academy of Sciences at Vienna “On Memory as 
a Universal Function of Organized Matter,” Butler endorsed his col-
league’s associationist account of memory, thereby confirming both 
his own neo-Lamarckian conclusions that all the movements of liv-
ing beings derives from an original volition that devolves over time 
into reflex activity, and also the principle that any such movement 
depends on interaction with the environment. For an associationist, 
molecular vibrations within the organism are alone too “feeble to 
generate action,” which must be prompted by other, external ob-
jects.10 This is true even of memory, since recollection (or the re-
enactment of an action by habit) is triggered by the appearance of 
ideas that have themselves habitually produced such activity: “The 
action ensues which is proper to the vibrations of the particular 
substance under the particular conditions” (Unconscious Memory, p. 
162). Therefore, as long as the relationship between external and 
internal vibrations remains relatively consistent, ideas will transmit 
more or less faithfully, but with some favorable variation, from one 
generation to the next. Of course, experience of the external world 
is neither consistent nor predictable. In Unconscious Memory, But-
ler devoted an entire chapter to a translation of Hering’s speech, 
which argued that in human ontogeny, where infants develop less 
in vitro and more after birth than other, lower animals, there is a 
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much more robust postnatal interaction between the body and the 
immediate environment. Humans develop “under the influence of 
impressions made by the environment upon [the] senses” and are 
thus more individualized than animals who receive their memories 
“readymade, and of a more final, stereotyped character” (p. 92). 
Like Butler, however, Hering also stressed the limits to which 
radically foreign ideas can embed themselves in memory and thus 
achieve perpetuity through the medium of the body: 
The most sublime ideas, though never so immortalized in speech or letters, are 
yet nothing for heads that are out of harmony with them; they must be not 
only heard, but reproduced; and both speech and writing would be in vain 
were there not an inheritance of inward and outward brain development, 
growing in correspondence with the inheritance of ideas that are handed 
down from age to age, and did not an enhanced capacity for their reproduc-
tion on the part of each succeeding generation accompany the thoughts that 
have been preserved in writing. (p. 94)
Ideas cannot be out of step with the brains that absorb and repro-
duce them—these are intertwined in evolutionary history; if ideas 
outstrip the minds they design to influence, they are rendered use-
less and sterile. The monstrous hybrids they attempt to incorporate 
into memory will bring about both their own demise and subse-
quently threaten the mental stability of the living beings on which 
they prey. At the same time, because “no organism can permanently 
outlive its experience of past lives” (p. 163), it will either die or else 
fall into a state of spiritual despair if it finds itself absorbing ideas 
that are too radical, foreign, or complex for its ancestral memories 
to accommodate. Yet, it is not only inherited predisposition, but “an 
enhanced capacity for their reproduction” that does allow new ideas 
to flourish. Here, Hering might be referring to increasing brain size; 
but equally, he might mean that certain human technologies, in-
cluding writing, have opened the mind to a much greater range of 
possible ideas than it was formerly capable of absorbing, and subse-
quently recording and transmitting. By extending into the nonor-
ganic environment, this would suggest, minds can entertain a much 
wider range of possibilities than biological memory dictates. 
Writing, of course, exponentially enhances the reproduction of 
ideas. As David Amigoni has emphasized, Butler saw written sym-
bolic communication consisting less of the material text—the “ink-
age and paperage” by means of which words are stored—as of the 
metaphors that enable ideas to move between minds and transpose 
ideas; they are therefore machinate extensions that enhance human 
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communication.11 This very specifically literary conception of writ-
ing is also the means by which minds communicate ideas across 
time: “The written symbol extends infinitely as regards time and 
space, the range within which one mind can communicate with an-
other. It gives the writer’s mind a life limited by the duration of ink, 
paper, and readers, as against that of his flesh and blood body.”12 
The word becomes flesh in the transmission of ideas, but language’s 
meaning vastly outlives the body it inhabits. Where literary lan-
guage can extend the mind beyond that which it is biologically ca-
pable of entertaining, in other words, fantastic possibilities may live 
to become realities. Fiction, therefore, may entertain the outland-
ish without risking obscurity or cultivating despair; through its very 
form, it helps adapt readerly thought to a world larger and stranger 
than minds shaped solely by organic habit are capable of grasping.
Machines of the Future in Erewhon
Butler published Erewhon in 1872, followed by a revised edition 
in 1901, which included two new chapters representing much of 
what he outlined in Life and Habit. In the interim, he had temporar-
ily stopped writing fiction to focus on his never particularly well- 
received accounts of evolution and development. On the face of it, 
the return to speculative literature did not seem any more promis-
ing, since such writing by its very nature trades in the impossible, 
positing radical visions of future or remote forms of life that leap too 
wide of the knowledge of the world lodged in our ancestral memory. 
Yet, the first edition of Erewhon had fared well, achieving, as Butler 
put it “unlooked-for success.”13 A friend, he reports in the preface to 
the revised edition, attributed this success to the “sound of a new 
voice, and an unknown voice” (p. xiv). The qualities of “new” and 
“unknown” do not just refer to the fact that the story was published 
anonymously, but they also carry a charge in both its form and the 
content. As a satirical utopia in the vein of Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, 
Erewhon deploys the rhetorical figure of defamiliarization. In so do-
ing, it extends reading minds into forms of reflection they are not 
normally able to accommodate, even as it ties such unfamiliar ideas 
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to the unconscious memories that for Butler are fundamental to all 
life. It therefore tries to navigate a balance between the common 
sense of inherited ideas that every organism depends on to survive, 
and an “uncommon sense” that, with the help of wild literary imag-
ination, can extend awareness into foreign and future landscapes, 
where it may shift even the most powerful cultural paradigms.
 At the most obvious level, Erewhon makes the institutional pil-
lars of Victorian society—education, finance, religion, and criminal 
justice—appear ludicrous, biased, hypocritical, and unfair under 
the traveler’s gaze and in the unlikely setting of the New Zealand 
South Island alps. It turns out, however, that the story’s antipathy 
is as much toward reformers who ignore the ingrained habits of or-
dinary people as toward the norms and prejudices of the Victorian 
social world. Erewhon depicts a society in which ideas are segregated 
from organic memory, with disastrous consequences. In particular, 
the three chapters on the Book of the Machines show how laws that 
violate evolutionary principles stunt human growth. Imported from 
articles Butler wrote for the new daily Christchurch publication The 
Press—“Darwin Among the Machines” (1863) and “Lucubration 
Ebria” (1865)—these chapters represent two different accounts of 
the posthuman future: the first is the horrific prospect of a world 
where machinate beings dominate humans; the second an optimis-
tic forecast that the human incorporation of machines will expand 
our civilizational horizons.14 The Erewhonians, who have been en-
couraged by their intellectual leaders to adopt the first view, legislate 
against machines out of fear that they may extend mind so far that 
it will cast off the human body that nominally houses it. 
Indeed, the political history of Erewhon has been, in large part, 
shaped by efforts to mute this evolutionary inevitability. Following 
a civil war between machinists and anti-machinists, the narrator 
learns, the country underwent a draconian political reformation. 
This break with history and tradition was founded on a single book—
Book of the Machines—that prophesied mechanical inventions would 
usher in a new phase of mind as foreign to the present incarnation 
of consciousness as consciousness is to the most primitive incarna-
tion of life. Recognizing that “everything is interwoven with every-
thing” (p. 234), the book warned that machines develop infinitely 
more rapidly than animals, and anticipated a time when they could 
feel, think, and communicate independently and therefore dispense 
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entirely with the agency of human senses. In this future mechani-
cal life, human beings, already the bondsmen of machines, would 
become merely parasitical on them or else enslaved, like the inferior 
species of dogs and horses are to humans. The author of this book 
shrinks with horror simultaneously at the idea that the human race 
could be surpassed in this way, and at the evidence to which it im-
plicitly points of our primitive, nonhuman ancestry. Persuaded that 
they must do everything they can to prevent the monstrous eventu-
ality of the posthuman future, therefore, the Erewhonians destroyed 
all their machines or else quarantined them in museums, and those 
suspected of using them were imprisoned or executed. 
Even in their determination to avert this looming catastrophe, 
it must be said, the anti-machinists also recognized the power of 
technology to advance knowledge beyond anything that mere flesh 
alone is capable of discovering: the telescope, or “seeing engine” 
(p. 241), Book of the Machines conceded, has not only brought the 
“scenery of the moon” and the “geography of the planets” to the 
human retina, but in so doing, has appended itself to the very iden-
tity of the modern observing self. This is not a sudden and radical 
change in human experience, the author goes on to say, since an eye 
is really itself a machine the creature looks through, and the eye of 
a dead animal works for a time nearly as well as that of a living one. 
To tear the body away from the machines into which it extends, 
even this reactionary text admits, would be to render it senseless.
Although Erewhonian puritanism ultimately triumphed, the nar-
rator discovers further evidence of an opposing machinist philoso-
phy that, like the concessions made in Book of the Machines, empha-
sizes the marvels of extension. In this heretical text, machines are 
described as “extra-corporeal limbs” (p. 267): while lower animals 
keep their limbs attached to their bodies, its author points out, hu-
man beings have the advantage that they can distribute theirs across 
external space. Even as they undo the metaphysical coherence of 
human nature, such inventions add to “the resources of the human 
body” (p. 268).15 A man who digs with a spade has “modified him-
self not as other animals are modified, by circumstances over which 
they have had not even the appearance of control, but having, as 
it were, taken forethought and added a cubit to his stature” (ibid.). 
A man’s memory, like the subject of Clark and Chambers’s experi-
ment, “goes in his pocket book,” an “extra-corporeal member” 
(p. 269) that is more important to him than his hair or his whiskers. 
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Such capacity for extension is the origin of civilization, sociality, 
and “all those habits of mind which most elevate man above the 
lower animals” (p. 268). 
 Of course, it is impossible to say that Butler’s tongue was not 
somewhere in his cheek at this point.16 The machinist author seems 
to fall into habits of Erewhonian bigotry when he concedes that 
machines may “lessen the severity of competition” and thus trigger 
“a degeneracy of the human race” (pp. 268–269). He scarcely seems 
bothered that the incorporate body—the body that carries extra, 
artificial limbs—will be owned only by the most opulent citizenry, 
whereas the “souls of the poor [will remain] clogged and hampered 
by matter” (p. 270). The moral and intellectual improvement of 
mankind, which he holds up as evidence of the marvelous integra-
tion of organic and machinate entities, turns out to produce a natu-
ral deference of the poor toward the rich, like the “respect which 
all living creatures pay to those whom they recognize as higher 
than themselves in the scale of animal life” (p. 271). At the same 
time, the anti-machinist author of Book of the Machines continues to 
sound periodically like his opponent, challenging readers to identify 
a true distinction between human and machine: if we try to say that 
only the former exercises free will, or imaginative independence, we 
ignore the evolutionary fact that all life is constituted out of the 
agencies and forces that preexist it. Moreover, there is little that hu-
man beings can do to challenge their destiny: “A little reflection 
will teach us that the most daring flight of the imagination or the 
most subtle exercise of the reason is as much the thing that must 
arise, and the only thing that can by any possibility arise, at the 
moment of its arising, as the falling of a dead leaf when the wind 
shakes it from the tree” (p. 257). The absolute determinism of the 
anti-machinist sits uncomfortably with the will of his disciples to 
wipe out both the past and the future through the destruction of the 
machines; meanwhile, the natural hierarchism and degenerationist 
theories of the machinist undermine his veneration of the evolu-
tionary advances that humankind has been able to make through 
its incorporation of machinate objects. Neither position, therefore, 
quite anchors the satire. Instead, Butler seems to hold up common 
sense, the collective body of memory that structures all life, as the 
truth in whose light every grand project and philosophical posture 
appear patently absurd. 
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Yet, because common sense, which ensures the continuity of the 
present with the past and patterns the future, is shaped by uncon-
scious memory, it can only be brought to attention through the 
agency of an unfamiliar idea, and in the process becomes something 
else entirely. Were we to know the past and present fully and con-
sciously, the machinist dreams, “the future, in its minutest details, 
would lie spread out before our eyes, and we should lose our sense 
of time present by reason of the clearness with which we should 
see the past and the future; perhaps we should not be even able 
to distinguish time at all; but that is foreign” (p. 258). Gifted with 
such lucid perception, humans would act toward every aspect of the 
present with the utmost care and proceed on the ground of utmost 
faith. As long as we believe that the future is a lottery, on the other 
hand, we will not truly work, but only speculate, and holding lit-
tle more than a tremulous faith, we will inevitably drift away from 
moral principles. Satiric defamiliarization—the uncanny estrange-
ment and distortion of the everyday that thrusts the reader into a 
remote and often topsy-turvy, yet oddly recognizable world—tries 
to open the present into the future by making that which is deeply 
familiar and therefore invisible, strange and therefore visible. It ex-
tends awareness into the unconsciously known past and present. 
And because it can be accommodated to common experience and 
inherited ideas, it leads neither to extinction nor despair.17
The possibility that satire itself may be part of the cure for Ere-
whon’s political madness becomes quite overt in the closing chap-
ters. “I can see no hope for the Erewhonians,” the narrator remarks 
of their cruel or absurd laws, observing that “reason uncorrected by 
instinct is as bad as instinct uncorrected by reason” (p. 294). In this 
obvious allusion to the miserable alternatives of Swift’s Yahoos and 
Hounynyms, Butler suggests that societies ignore the evolutionary 
past, and the common sense that embodies it in the present, at their 
peril. In a society that has wandered too far from common sense to 
be sustainable, the inhabitants “cut their [own] throats” (p. 272). 
Yet, irony itself may help them avoid their fate. Sections added in 
the revised edition on “The Rights of Animals” and “The Rights of 
Vegetables” introduce a prophet who wants to “reduce rights and 
wrongs to rules” and “put all sorts of matters on a logical basis,” and 
who inspires legislation against eating meat. In the second added 
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chapter, he is answered by an Erewhonian philosopher, who speaks 
almost verbatim from Life and Habit, pointing out that since all life 
is a continuation of the personalities of its ancestors and that plants, 
like animals, are motivated only by the unconscious knowledge that 
forms them, there is no better reason to eat vegetables than animals. 
The satire moves in the opposite direction to something like Swift’s 
A Modest Proposal, yet, it rests on a similar vision of cataclysm: the 
logic of care taken to extreme will starve the Erewhonians out of 
existence, whereas in Swift’s Ireland the inhabitants are reduced to 
cannibalism. Presented with the absurd violation of common sense 
that their legislation entails, the Erewhonians repeal the acts forbid-
ding the use of meat.
However, even as satiric defamiliarization speaks for common 
sense, it also becomes a tool of self-awareness, making us conscious 
of our bonds to the past and in so doing opening perception up be-
yond habit. Eating does become cannibalism when the comfortable, 
commonplace distinctions among human, animal, and vegetable 
are unsettled. Even though we “cannot get rid of persecution” be-
cause it is in the very nature of life—one entity is always assimilating 
another—we can become conscious of our relationships with other 
beings with the help of disquieting observations, such as “man is 
the only animal that can remain on friendly terms with the victims 
he intends to eat until he eats them.”18 Where dogmatic reason and 
draconian reform merely crush and distort our self-knowledge and 
thus our true capacity for change, satiric irony—a device for mak-
ing conscious what is unconscious—can open our eyes to our own 
nature, as well as to our profound connections with other living 
organisms.
 Butler’s use of utopian satire, with its blending of the foreign and 
the familiar, then, aims at nothing less than restructuring organic 
memory. This carries the risk, of course, that it will overextend and 
perish; and indeed, in its outlandishness, Erewhon seems to come 
perilously close to the kind of anomaly that is inevitably short-
lived. The preposterous account of a society secluded in the New 
Zealand South Island alps, with its slippery satiric commentary on 
Victorian England, seems to flaunt this anomalous and incoherent 
character. Yet, Erewhon itself is the descendent of older satiric travel 
narratives, in particular Thomas More’s Utopia, as well as Gulliver’s 
Travels. Erewhon remembers a “nowhere” like More’s—a utopia that 
offers a fantastic alternative to the exigencies of real political life—
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and Gulliver’s Hounynymland, the “discovery” of a deluded trav-
eler where, for his at once culturally primitive, highly rational, and 
brutal and narrow-minded hosts, everything that Gulliver knows, 
wears, or carries represents a form of dangerous extension beyond 
the limits of the natural body. Like these earlier stories, it does not 
measure folly and vice against a norm of reason and virtue, but ex-
poses the short-sightedness of both host and visitor in what one 
critic has called an “endless reversal of meanings.”19 Butler’s ironic 
assertion in the preface that the truth of his story can be ascertained 
by its internal consistency therefore only points to an unacknowl-
edged debt to earlier forms. His narrator, like most tall tale–telling 
travelers, breaks with the past by announcing at the very beginning 
that he will say nothing of his antecedents or the circumstances that 
led him to leave his native country. Thus, even as he claims his indi-
vidual past is a blank, he invokes a common trope of entrepreneur-
ial travel literature in which the events of early life are rushed over 
if not omitted altogether. Just as every action is linked to the ances-
tral past in human behavior, every gesture is motivated by appar-
ently unconscious literary memory in narrative form, and brought 
to light through irony.
Ostensibly unaware of such literary debts, Butler described him-
self as the “enfant terrible of literature and science.”20 His precocity, 
combined with his unconventionality, boasted a capacity to unleash 
thought from ancestral habits, outstripping those everyday endeav-
ors by which we find “we have grown all our limbs on the strength 
of the likings of our ancestors and adopt these without question.”21 
He claims for himself the genius described in Life and Habit of the 
“creature with exceptional powers of memory or reflection,” who 
occasionally makes an appearance in “this race or that” (p. 245). Yet, 
Erewhon remains one of the two most well-read of Butler’s works, 
confirming that even genius, at least if it is to be remembered as 
such, has ties to common understanding: it belongs to the world of 
the flesh. As “uncommon sense,” genius is a “breach of the peace” 
that “points to a change and change is a hankering after another 
world”;22 it lures us to another reality, “a state of things which has 
no counterpart here.” Yet, it does not eradicate the past, but only 
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“warps the woof of actions and things from the atom to the uni-
verse.”23 The weaving metaphor is suggestive, evoking both the un-
derlying architecture on which new structures can be built and the 
creation of new forms in the process of threading one fiber through 
another. Imaginative literature, even as it is embedded in the life-
world, allows the mind to leap part way out of inherited disposition. 
Although it may represent what in other forms of life constitutes 
“too wide a cross,”24 the utopian satire, the literary failure that But-
ler thought fell short of an “organic whole” (Erewhon, p. xvi) may 
alter the script of development; prompting outlandish and yet, at 
the same time, strangely familiar perceptions, it allows us to grow 
new limbs. 
Writing for the Future: The Way of All Flesh
If utopian satire, for Butler, allowed strange twists of memory to 
challenge reason and political tyranny on the one hand and blind 
instinct on the other, the realist genre of Bildungsroman enabled 
him to navigate a path between patriarchal despotism and inherited 
disposition. Although he accused George Eliot of conservatism by 
comparing her success with the author who writes “fearlessly for 
posterity” and does not get paid for it,25 his posthumously published 
The Way of All Flesh followed most of the conventions of the Bil-
dungsroman. Nonetheless, it looked ahead to the alienating forms 
and fractured selves of modernism, as it blended the story of indi-
vidual development with Butler’s theories of evolution and identity 
(and for that reason lived out his prediction that works of genius will 
achieve notoriety and impact only in future generations once they 
have been, to some degree, assimilated into perceptual habits).26 The 
trope of self-improvement that characterizes the Bildungsroman be-
comes in Butler’s hands the “blending of unfamiliar elements” that, 
while it may produce marvelous innovations, may in subsequent 
generations result in unsuccessful or abnormal growths.27 Con-
versely, however, such corruptions of form may increase the physi-
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cal and moral power of the anomalous structure—improvements 
“that might in some measure descend to [its] offspring” (p. 380). 
The uncertainties that attend such experimentation in The Way of 
All Flesh shape both character and plot.
The story traces the growth of the mind—in this case, the mind 
of Ernest Pontifex, the son of a minister, the grandson of a self-made 
man, and the great-grandson of a carpenter—not in a single life, 
but through multiple generations and in dynamic relationship with 
its surroundings. In so doing, it explores both how mind extends 
through time and how it is distributed across bodies. Thus, even 
while the novel shows personal identity determined by the evolu-
tionary past, it also opens up the self to the chance encounters of 
the present, or the events that take place after birth, when the or-
ganism, faced with environmental influences, begins to forget some 
of what it knows at the cellular level about how to live (LH, p. 60). 
The Bildungsroman, then, can record the emergence of traits that 
are only possible in ontogenetic time, while showing how these cut 
across deeply embedded tendencies from organic memory. With the 
help of “ inkage and paperage,” it can then allow the strange itera-
tions of this process, including the unsuccessful ones, to be trans-
mitted to future generations. Forms of life that would perish in the 
present may be recovered by future generations of readers, where 
they may be more successful and even eventually settle as habits.
 Where the narrator of Erewhon learns nothing from his adven-
tures and returns to England with the same narrow ambitions to 
wealth that fired his exploration of new territory, Ernest learns to 
overcome the self-punishing tendencies instilled in him by family 
and education to secure a more satisfying life and stable identity. 
The child of a frustrated clergyman who tries to bully his son into 
the life path and habits that his own father demanded of him, and 
an overly pious mother whose love for her children is outweighed 
by submission to her husband, Ernest’s affections, desires, and in-
clinations (many of which are inherited from his much more de-
cent paternal great-grandfather) bruise themselves against the au-
thoritarian climate in which he grows, and he becomes incapable 
of reconciling his behavior with his sense of obligation. When, in 
early adulthood, his naïve confusion between desire and duty makes 
him the victim of a swindle, a failed clergyman, an unwitting se-
ducer, and then a prisoner, he suffers a complete mental collapse, 
following which he is finally able to renounce his familial obliga-
tions and attempt to rebuild his life according to his own talents 
and wishes. A failed marriage, however, softens this determination 
to completely sever himself from his past, and, reconciled with his 
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parents, he lives out the rest of his life as a writer who, in keep-
ing with the barely concealed autobiography in this story, writes 
“queer, impractical” books, the most successful of which consist of 
essays that “steered between iconoclasm . . . and credulity” (Way, p. 
415), but that despite, or (in light of Erewhon) perhaps because of, its 
outlandish proposals “abounded with humour, just satire, and good 
sense” (p. 416).
During the period of his early youth when his psychological 
health is clearly in jeopardy, his godfather and caretaker Edward 
Overton (the narrator) expresses the hope that his godson’s errors 
of judgment may be attributed to “postnatal rather than congeni-
tal misfortunes” (p. 289). Personality-shaping events that have oc-
curred in the ancestral past, impressing the mind of the individual 
even before it is born, this suggests, deliver virtually inescapable 
consequences. The effects of accidents that occur in a single life, on 
the other hand, may be reversed, although it is also likely that they 
will create permanent effects that may be communicated to subse-
quent generations. Hence, the tragedy of the Pontifex line, where 
ambition has warped lives and minds by cramping innate behav-
ioral tendencies too far. However, because in Butler’s evolutionism 
ontogeny does not simply enact the script handed to it by phylog-
eny, the mind of the child does not unfold into maturity any more 
predictably than a young seal stays afloat “if put out of its depth 
before its parents have taught it to swim” or a young hawk can fly 
before it is taught (p. 333). Parental instruction should, by this logic, 
help the young animal to realize its potential. In human beings, 
this depends in large part on the prevailing cultural norms of child-
rearing or the attitude of “a sufficient number of reasonable people” 
(p. 53). In a culture that cultivates maxims like “spare the rod and 
spoil the child” and “check[s] the first signs of self-will,” therefore, 
parents inevitably twist development away from its unconscious 
proclivities, with the result, as it threatens to be in Ernest’s case, a 
steady slide toward despair.
The best hope for Ernest, it turns out, is a form of therapy that 
draws attention to our relationships with other beings. This treat-
ment, sought out on his behalf by Overton, who assumes the role of 
parental caretaker, nurtures deliberately and consciously the kind of 
perpetual interchange between organisms and their environments 
that produces and sustains life: “All our lives long, every day and 
every hour, we are engaged in the process of accommodating our 
changed and unchanged selves to changed and unchanged sur-
rounding, living, in fact, in nothing else than this process of ac-
commodation” (p. 327). Ernest’s suffering is directly caused by his 
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efforts to suppress both the deep habits and the inherent otherness 
of mind, and by his conviction that failing to will himself into the 
person his parents wish him to be means (paradoxically) that he 
is “badly formed” (p. 203). Actively practicing accommodation of 
the external world, however, helps to heal the rift between familial 
indoctrination and inherited disposition. Too mentally exhausted 
even to be sent on a restorative European tour, he is instructed by a 
doctor to spend time at the zoo, examining the larger mammals—
especially the hippopotamus, rhinoceros, and elephants, who of all 
the animals offer the widest cross that Ernest can experience without 
taking the nervous risks associated with leaving his home country. 
“Seeing,” the doctor proposes, “is a mode of touching, touching is a 
mode of feeding, feeding is a mode of assimilation, assimilation is a 
mode of recreation and reproduction, and this is crossing—shaking 
yourself into something else and something else into you” (p. 374). 
Despite a lingering suspicion that the doctor is not entirely serious, 
Overton embraces the strange possibilities in the satire and himself 
experiences these zoo visits as restorative, allowing “a new influx of 
life, or a new way of seeing life, which amounts to the same thing” 
(p. 375). By embracing the unfamiliar and willfully testing a new en-
vironment in which he encounters creatures remote from him in or-
ganic memory, he, like Ernest, changes his very emotional makeup. 
As a sort of psychotherapeutic dramatization of the theses of Life 
and Habit, the novel proposes that, although life is formed out of 
deep ancestral tendencies, seeing the fundamental interrelatedness 
of all matter enables transformations for the better in developmen-
tal time. Identity, Ernest’s strange yet successful treatment reveals, is 
not discrete, for “we are infinite as regards time . . . [and] extension” 
and “we cannot say where we either begin or end” (LH, p. 104).28 
 Fostering the inter-species exchange of “ideas” in this way 
amounts to much the same thing in Butler’s terms as using lan-
guage. Language is the “intentional conveyance of ideas from one 
being to another through the instrumentality of arbitrary tokens or 
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symbols agreed upon.”29 In his essay “Thought and Language,” he 
argues that human beings are not, by virtue of language, specially 
created outside of the process of descent with modification. As long 
as language is understood as the transposition of ideas, the com-
munication of ideas “to another living being,” lower animals must 
be said to possess it also. All animals can “remember, reflect upon, 
modify these ideas according to modified surroundings, and inter-
change them with one another.” As language, the crossing of ideas 
provides a horizontal axis of variation within the lifetime of an or-
ganism that cuts across the vertical transmission of ideas through 
descent.
Yet, if language in this broad sense is not unique to human be-
ings, written language, which “leaves a material trace as long as 
paper and ink last,” is most certainly so. The capacity of written 
words to leapfrog over time and speak their ideas to later genera-
tions renders those physical words—agreed-upon symbols that carry 
ideas from one mind to another—machinate extensions of the bod-
ies that call and reach out to others. It is in this sense that anoma-
lous works of “genius” may take hold and create a species-level turn 
in habit. Ernest’s one literary success, a work titled Essays and Re-
views, recalls Erewhon in its outlandish proposals about his society 
(including a eugenicist notion that the highest good depends on the 
greatest happiness of the beautiful and well-bred) and in the way it 
rings “alike with conviction and the lack of conviction” (p. 415). 
His talent, like Butler’s own, is considered by most people to be of a 
“queer, impractical” kind (p. 429), and it always creates the impres-
sion that he speaks in jest. The uneasy feeling of being mocked that 
his contemporary readers and would-be publishers feel suggests that 
its genre is satire—in other words, that it estranges and brings to 
light something so profoundly habitual that it has escaped the no-
tice of reasonable people. The instinctual revulsion of the flesh that 
Ernest’s determination to offend creates and his willful refusal to 
“write like other people” (p. 428) withers his career as the writer in 
the present. But in a utopian vein, it aims to open the eyes of future 
readers—readers whose habits may have adjusted to its sensory as-
sault thanks to the influence that inkage and paperage can achieve 
over time. Satiric writing will, in this way, cause a shaking up and 
out into other ways of being, or so Ernest presumably hopes when 
he replies to his frustrated publisher with only one word: “—‘wait’” 
(p. 430).
In a recent issue of The Chronicle of Higher Education, William Ger-
neill / the Machinate Literary animal 77
30. William Germano, “Do We Dare Write for Readers?” The Chronicle Review, April 22, 
2013. http://chronicle.com/article/Do-We-Dare-Write-for-Readers-/138581/.
31.Amigoni, “Samuel Butler and the Writing of Evolutionary Theory” (above, n. 11), 
p. 108.
mano challenged writers of scholarly books to exchange the “snow 
globe” approach to academic writing—a “perfect, tidy, improbable 
world where no questions are asked, or invited—for the “machine 
model.” In machine writing, he suggested, the work waits to have 
something done with it rather than inspiring detached admiration: 
“the book-as-machine should trouble or excite . . . or even con-
fuse.”30 Butler—surely a writer who, rather than sealing off impos-
sible, strange, or utopian worlds, maneuvers them to speak forward 
into our intellectual era—seems to answer this challenge. His novels 
suggest the work of literature in the evolving world and the possibil-
ity that, as Amigoni puts it, “books could become machinate exten-
sions of the human.”31 Embracing aberrations in both cognitive and 
cultural development, they offer to rupture unconscious memory 
in a way that promises species-level change; stories written for read-
ers who cannot yet swallow them whole, they represent impossible 
breaks with the past. And yet, they are like cunningly wrought ar-
tificial limbs that may, in time, become attached to living human 
bodies. 
